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THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE ARBITRATION
STATUTES TO PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT
TO LMRA SECTION 301
"It is the policy of national labor legislation to promote the
arbitral process."1 This national labor policy has been expressed by
the courts in their interpretation of section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.' A friendliness toward the arbitration process also
emanates from many of the state legislative arenas.'
The United States Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,4 held that section 301 authorized "federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law, specific
performance of the promises to arbitrate grievances under collective
bargaining agreements."5 The Court's holding pre-empted state law
with respect to collective bargaining agreements containing arbitra-
tion provisions and falling under section 301, and thus state courts
must apply federal law in litigation involving such agreements.6 This
"federal law" is to be derived from the state laws, the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, and other federal acts.7
Today arbitration is an invaluable tool in the area of labor
relations and it has become an accepted and much lauded method
1 District 50, U.M.W. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Md.
1962). See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947). The pertinent part of the
section reads as follows:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
3 Goldberg, "A Supreme Court justice Looks at Arbitration," 20 Arb. J. (n.s.)
13 (1965); see, e.g., Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 v. Thriftimart, Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr.
12, 380 P.2d 652 (1963); Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 363 P.2d
313 (1961).
4 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5 Id. at 451.
6 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1961).
7 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 4, at 456-57.
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of settling disputes. Over ninety percent of the collective bargaining
agreements have some provision for the use of arbitration.8 These
arbitration provisions vary, but they generally give the arbitrator the
right to arbitrate only disputes "concerning the interpretation and
application of some provision or provisions of this agreement."9 The
objectives of arbitration are naturally varied, being dependent upon
the diverse factual situation involved. However, certain advantages
generally accrue to those who choose to use arbitration rather than
the courts to settle their disputes. These are: (1) The arbitration
procedure is often more expedient;'o (2) The arbitration procedure
is often felt to be a fairer form of settlement, due to the arbitrator's
expertise in a particular field;" (3) The arbitration procedure is
often less expensive than its courtroom analogue."
Disputes are generally processed by means of a grievance pro-
cedure. Such a procedure consists of a number of appellate steps, the
uppermost step usually being arbitration. These grievance steps elimi-
nate many of the more routine complaints that arise in labor-manage-
ment relations so that relatively few reach arbitration. The grievance
procedure helps the parties achieve their objective: continuance of
work and industrial peace. It is the desire to avoid industrial strife in
the form of a strike or lockout, not the avoidance of resort to the
courts, that is the primary motive behind the use of arbitration by labor
and management." Labor-management disputes covered by an arbitra-
tion agreement may vary with the situation and the extent that the
parties rely on the system. Typically included, however, are disputes
as to the application or interpretation of bargained rules relating to
pay, hours, and wrongful discharge.'4
I. THE APPLICATION OF STATE ARBITRATION STATUTES
Most states today have some type of arbitration statute. 5 These
statutes typically define: (1) the type of arbitration agreements valid
8 Smith & Jones, "Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the
Arbitration Process: A Report and Comments," 62 lich. L. Rev. 1115, n.1 (1964).
9 Smith & Jones, "The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law," 63 Mich. L. Rev. 751, 754 (1965).
10 The court in United Steelworkers v. American Internat'l Aluminum Corp., 334
F.2d 147, 153 n.11 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965), referred to labor
arbitration as "a catalyst in labor peace because of its speed."
11 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 13, 14.
12 Ibid.
13 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); General Electric
Co. v. Local 205, "[EW, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
14 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 13, 14.
15 Fleming, "Arbitrators and the Remedy Power," 48 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1200 (1962).
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under state law; (2) the authority of the arbitrator; (3) the procedure
and grounds for a stay of action pending arbitration; and (4) the
procedure and grounds for modification, vacation or confirmation
of the award. Any action, however, in the state courts involving
arbitration between an employer and a union representing employees
in an industry affecting interstate commerce is controlled by the Labor
Management Relation Act, namely section 301.16 Since federal law
controls and since the rights of the parties are derived from section
301, the question posed is what effect the state arbitration statutes
have on arbitration agreements falling under section 301. Since arbi-
tration procedures are not expressly referred to in section 301, can a
court properly apply state arbitration statute provisions in a section 301
proceeding? When the parties to a labor arbitration agreement rely
upon section 301 to get before the court, can the court vacate the award,
appoint the arbitrator, or enforce the arbitrator's issuance of a sub-
poena?
Since arbitration procedure varies among the states, a problem
will arise. For example, assume an arbitration provision (within a
section 301 collective bargaining contract) which fails to specify the
manner of appointing the arbitrator should a grievance arise. In Ohio,
the state statute provides for court appointment of an arbitrator where
no such procedure has been set out in the agreement.'7 In Alabama,
the statute provides that the arbitrator is to be chosen by the parties,"8
while in Indiana the statute is silent on the appointment of an arbitra-
tor. If the parties are relying upon section 301 (which the Supreme
Court has interpreted as requiring that a federal rule is to be formu-
lated), should different results be permitted? Of what influence is
local law in this situation and in other situations where state law is
not uniform? Is a "per se application," a "prima facie application,"
or a "nonapplication" of state arbitration statutes proper? These clas-
sifications of the possible methods of applications of state statutes in
a section 301 proceeding will subsequently be defined and analyzed.
"Per se application" means that the statute is applied without
a consideration of any federal labor policy and all the provisions are
necessarily applied to the arbitration proceedings. A per se application
denotes a conclusion that the federal labor policy is not pertinent to
the application of the state arbitration procedure statutes, and the
statutes are to be applied according to their own legislative intent.
In a "prima facie application" the statutes are to be applied
16 The requisite effects on interstate commerce must, of course, exist.
17 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.04 (Page 1953).
18 Ala. Code tit. 7, §§ 829, 830 (1958).
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unless there is a conflict with the federal labor policy. This policy
must necessarily be determined by the court in each situation on a
case by case method. If the application of the particular state arbitra-
tion provision in question would be at odds with federal labor policy,
the provision would not be applied. If there is no clash, the provision
would be applied. 19
Since section 301 does not expressly require any particular
arbitration procedure, "non-application" of the state statute would
result if it was concluded that, because of the federal policy of favoring
arbitration, the state arbitration statutes should only be used by the
court as a guideline as to what a general federal "statute" should be.
Rather than applying the statute of the particular state, the court
would determine from all the statutes what the uniform provisions
should be.
Thus, it must first be determined how the state arbitration
statutes are to be applied. If it is found that the statutes should not
be applied per se, then it would be necessary for the courts to look at
the particular provisions within the statutes.
A. Per se Application
Since the right to sue for breach of a collective bargaining contract
between an employer and a labor union representing employees in
an industry affecting interstate commerce is derived from section 301,
of what application are state arbitration statutes to arbitration pro-
visions within such a contract? This question has its roots in the
Lincoln Mills cases and was generally alluded to by the Supreme Court
in Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney'° where the court, noting the congres-
sional concern over the breadth of section 301, stated that:
[T]he record of the congressional debates on section 301 of the
1947 Act reflects the same concern with the adequacy of the laws of
the various states as had been expressed the previous year in the
discussion of section 10 of the Case bill. The Minority Report in the
House in 1947 again discussed the availability of relief, the alterna-
tive means of recovery, and the scope of remedy in suits against
labor organizations under the laws of the various states.
In considering the pre-emptive force of section 301, it is necessary
19 This type of application must include a de minimis proviso or else it would be
unmanageable. When the provision only has a minimum adverse effect on the federal
policy the provision should still be applied.
20 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
21 Section 10 of the Case bill is relatively the same provision as is presently & 301.
Id. at 511.
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to look at the national labor policy. The Lincoln Mills case22 is the
first important Supreme Court case involving section 301 and labor
arbitration. Lincoln Mills involved a collective bargaining agreement
that provided a grievance procedure, the ultimate step of which was
arbitration. Certain grievances had arisen and had been handled
according to the agreed preliminary procedure, but when arbitration
was demanded by the union, the employer refused. The union then
sought specific enforcement of the arbitration provision. The federal
district court granted specific performance but the court of appeals
reversed. Upholding the district court's decree the Supreme Court
held that section 301 was more than merely jurisdictional, and that
courts were to apply a federal substantive law which the courts were
to fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.2
The Supreme Court has not yet faced the question of how the
national labor policy affects the application of state arbitration statutes
in proceedings under section 301. One must look at the legislative
history behind section 301, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
that legislative history, and court determinations of what the national
labor arbitration policies are.
In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that labor arbitration provisions
could be specifically enforced. This answered the question of the
enforceability of arbitration provisions within contracts falling under
section 301, but it did not answer the question of what procedure
section 301 requires in these specifically enforced arbitration proceed-
ings. The Court did give an indication of the impact of section 301
when it agreed that "the legislative history of section 301 is somewhat
cloudy and confusing," 4 then went on to state that "the substantive
law to apply in suits under section 301(a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."25
The problem left by the Court is what situations should be included
within the term "substantive law."
In Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,26 the Court held that section 301
gave concurrent jurisdiction to both state and federal courts.2 The
fact that the state courts were held to have concurrent jurisdiction is
not, however, necessarily a license to apply state arbitration procedures
22 Note 4 supra.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 452.
25 Id. at 456.
26 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
27 There was no arbitration provision involved in the issue before the court in this
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to collective bargaining agreements falling under section 301. The
Court explains its interpretation of the legislative intent of section 301:
"[T]he Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 represented a
far-reaching and many-faced legislative effort to promote the achieve-
ment of industrial peace through encouragement and refinement of the
collective bargaining process."" Such legislative intent would imply
the inappropriateness of the per se application of state arbitration
statutes. Since federal law is to be applied to cases within section 301,
and since arbitration provisions within the collective bargaining agree-
ments are part of the design to promote the achievement of industrial
peace, a desire that there be a distinct federal arbitration procedure
could be inferred from the Dowd case. Thus Dowd holds that achieve-
ment of industrial peace was the goal of section 301, and Lincoln Mills
concludes that a federal substantive law must be created to promote
the achievement of this end 9
State arbitration statutes can have an effect upon this "encourage-
ment and refinement of the collective bargaining process" since labor
arbitration is an integral part of the collective bargaining process and
Csince it has long been part of the emerging national labor policy to
encourage voluntary arbitration as a way to industrial stability and
peace, it was inevitable that labor arbitration would be accorded 'the
central role . . . in effectuating national labor policy'."30 An example
of the extent to which the arbitration process is favored is shown by
the Supreme Court's holding that a presumption in favor of the
arbitrability of a dispute exists "unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage."31
A particular state statutory provision may tend to discourage
arbitration and thus have adverse effect upon an arbitration proceeding.
For example, under many arbitration statutes, the arbitrator is given
subpoena power. To illustrate the effect of the state statutes assume
an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement governed by
section 301. A grievance arises, and it has reached the final stage in the
grievance procedure-arbitration. During the arbitration proceeding
it is learned that the key witness for one of the parties involved in
the dispute will not appear voluntarily. If an arguably applicable state
-28 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962).
29 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 4.
30 Katz, "Arbitration-Favored Child of Pre-Emption," 17 N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor
27, 37 (1964).
31 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
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arbitration statute contains a subpoena provision, can the arbitrator
issue a subpoena to a reluctant witness and have it judicially enforced
by relying on section 301?32 Would it make a difference if the dispute
arose in a second state which does not have such a provision in its
arbitration statute? Such questions suggest an interrelationship between
state arbitration statutes and the labor arbitration process. Since the
enforceability of the collective bargaining agreement containing the
arbitration provisions is derived from section 301, must not the arbitra-
tor's subpoena power, if any, also be derived from section 301, rather
than from the state arbitration statutes? The Supreme Court in Lincoln
Mills held that a federal right was created by section 301 and that
the use of state law would be limited to "find [ing] the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy." 3 The applicable state law should
include only those state arbitration statutes which are consistent with
federal labor policy; that is, those statutes and statutory provisions
which favor the arbitration process. "It is important for labor peace
that the processes of arbitration not be permitted to fail."34
The courts have been constantly troubled by the interpretation of
the federal law and the extent to which it should be applied in the
arbitration area. The Dowd case,35 holding that section 301(a) did
not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts, the "trilogy"
cases, 36 holding that the question of arbitrability was to be settled by
the arbitrator and the Lucas case,37 holding that the state courts can
and must apply federal law in section 301 proceedings, all looked to see
if the arbitration statutes involved were consistent with federal labor
policy. Since the powers of the arbitrators are such a vital part of
this favored arbitration system, and since without such powers the
effectiveness of the arbitration proceedings would be seriously impaired,
why should the arbitration procedures not be governed by federal
labor policy? The intent of section 301, to create industrial peace and
stability, has fostered a federal labor policy that favors the use of
arbitration. Utilization of a state arbitration procedure statute without
reference to this federal labor policy would strike at the heart of the
stabilization of labor-management relations and thus defeat the
32 The subpoena power of the arbitrator will be discussed in detail, infra.
83 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 4 at 457.
34 Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. Local 612, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 418, 423 (5th
Cir. 1962).
35 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
36 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
37 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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thrust of section 301. First, however, there must be a determination
of whether the arbitration statute favorably or adversely affects the
arbitration proceeding with reference to that federal labor policy.
B. Prima Facie Application or Non-application
If the court holds that the state arbitration statutes should not
be applied per se to collective bargaining agreements under section
301, it must then be determined whether there should be either a
prima facie application or a non-application of those statutes. Non-
application of state arbitration statutes to section 301 contracts would
be advantageous to the national labor unions and employers who
enter into nationwide agreements. The non-application of state statutes
would create a steady growth of uniform national arbitration law.
Once this national arbitration law has been developed, unions and
employers could be assured that arbitration clauses in their national
agreements would receive uniform treatment throughout the country.
Although this advantage of uniformity will accrue to the negotiators
of other labor arbitration agreements as well, it is of particular im-
portance to the national agreements.
The basic question, however, is whether to interpret the Supreme
Court's mandate to use state arbitration law as a guideline in a strict
or in a liberal sense. Strict interpretation would mean that the statutes
must be used only as a guide to a general overview of what is contained
in all arbitration statutes and looked at in the light of section 301.
This would evolve a form of national labor arbitration law. Non-
application, however, in helping fashion a federal policy is not a
practical solution. To so apply the state arbitration statutes would
possibly result in a conglomeration of various court interpretations
within the same state as to what should or should not be part of the
federal policy. The mandate by the Supreme Court was vague, but
that is no reason why the national labor policy fashioned as a result of
that mandate must also be vague.
The state courts, as the federal courts, have not faced the problem
of the applicability of their arbitration statutes to proceedings subject
to section 301 to any great extent. There, however, have been instances
where the courts did first consider federal labor policy 8
In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. of Car.,39 the California
38 The reason the courts may not have considered the question of the applicability
of the state statutes may be due to administrative convenience. It is easy to look to
the state statute and not attempt to determine what the federal policy is and whether
any conflict exists.
39 49 Cal. 2d45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 932 (1958).
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Supreme Court faced the question of whether a state court could issue
an injunction in a suit under section 301, although, if brought in a
federal court, the injunction presumably could not be issued because of
the prohibition on federal courts against issuing injunctions in labor
disputes. This was a suit by a contractor against the union for damages
and injunctive relief against strikes allegedly caused by the unions.
Although there was an arbitration provision within the collective
bargaining agreement involved, the court said that it did not apply to
the determination of whether this particular strike breached the no-
strike clause in the agreement."
In McCarroll, the court interpreted section 301 to "facilitate the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by making unions
suable as entities in the federal courts, and thereby to remedy the
one-sided character of existing labor legislation."41 The court had mis-
interpreted the legislative intent of section 301. Making the unions
suable was only the means to industrial peace and stability, not an
end in itself. The court did, however, look first to federal labor policy
before determining whether the state court had the right to issue an
injunction, realizing that federal law was controlling.
The dissent in McCarroll by Justice Carter points out very
adequately that in Lincoln Mills a remedy was involved-that of
specific performance.12 Justice Carter said that "such remedy [injunc-
tive relief] is more than mere procedure. It goes to the very essence of
the right itself. In many instances, it would make the difference of
whether or not the right could be truly realized."43 He felt that federal
law should apply. The provisions of the various state arbitration
statutes likewise go to the very essence of this right. The subpoena
power of the arbitrator, the power of the court to modify, and other
provisions, all affect the outcome of the right asserted under section 301.
A California district court of appeals, in Laufman v. Hall-Mack
Co.,44 faced the question of the appealability of an order compelling
arbitration. Neither party questioned that the case came within section
301. The problem arose because the order was not appealable under
section 1294 of the California Code of Civil Procedure but would be
appealable in a federal court. The court held that because state
procedure applied, the order was not appealable. However, the court
based its holding upon its finding that federal law encourages arbitra-
40 Id. at 67, 315 P.2d at 334.
41 Id. at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
42 Id. at 72, 315 P.2d at 337.
43 Ibid.
44 215 Cal. App. 2d 87, 29 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1963).
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tion and the California policy behind their state procedure "is even
more encouraging of the use of arbitration than is the federal pro-
cedure."45 The court also went on to explain that "if appellant loses
in arbitration it then has a statutory right of appeal under section
1294 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ' 46 Thus, after looking at the
federal labor policy and its purpose and concluding that the state
procedure was consistent with this federal labor policy, the court
applied the state arbitration procedure. The court avoided a direct
clash between federal policy and state procedure by finding both were,
in reality, supplemental. Such an application by other state courts of
their arbitration statutes would require those courts to do as California
did; look to the state arbitration statute, determine if the provision in
question conformed with the federal labor policy, and if so, apply the
statute.
The rationale of the court in Laufman is consistent with the
Supreme Court's suggestion that "state law, if compatible with the
purpose of section 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that
will best effectuate the federal policy.147 But the Supreme Court has
warned that, any state law applied, "will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source of private rights."4 To comply
properly with the Supreme Court's mandate to apply federal law
in section 301 cases and the mandate to adhere to the federal policy
of favoring the arbitration process when it is a section 301 collective
bargaining agreement, the state courts should not indiscriminately
apply state arbitration statutes. Those statutes can affect the substance
of the controversy and are not mere "procedures."49
These cases have shown the flexibility and practicality of a prima
facie application of state arbitration statutes. The prima facie applica-
tion used by the courts, in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. of
Car.10 and Laufman v. Hall-Mack Co.,5 is a more practical approach to
the overall problem of application than a per se or non-application. It
will result in a more uniform handling of labor arbitration in section
301 contracts. The parties need to have some definite rules set down in
order to be able to formulate effectively an arbitration provision within
their collective bargaining contract that best suits their interests.
41 Id. at 89, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
46 Id. at 89-90, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
47 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 4, at 457.
48 Id. at 457.
49 See text beginning notes 66 infra.
90 49 Cal 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (Cal. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
51 215 Cal. App. 2d 87, 29 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1963).
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Without the state statutes to look to, the parties would be forced to
wait for a case-by-case creation of an arbitration procedure by the
courts. A prima facie application of the arbitration statutes would
give this needed definiteness and would at the same time comply more
closely to the Supreme Court's mandate than the other two methods
of application.
There will, naturally, be de minimis clashes in some situations,
but the courts, for the sake of convenience and practicality, should
not concern itself with such minimal clashes. For example, time
requirements for filing an application to vacate an award might vary
from state to state. The advantage of having such statutes of limitation
would override any disadvantages arising from the non-uniformity of
such statutes between the states.
The practicality of the prima facie application of state arbitration
statutes is considerable although, naturally, it alone is not determinative
of whether such a rule of application can be followed. The attorneys,
arbitrators, and parties, as well as the courts involved in the arbitra-
tion, need guidelines which can well be supplied by the state statutes.
Attorneys, arbitrators, parties, and courts are usually quite familiar
with their own individual state statutes and can thus work more
effectively under them than they could under a new and foreign set of
requirements or under no specific set at all in order to achieve the
goal of federal labor policy that encourages arbitration in labor disputes.
II. A SURVEY OF STATE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE STATUTES
Once it has been determined that there should be a prima facie
application of state arbitration statutes to section 301 contracts, it
follows that it must then be determined whether a specific provision
or the lack of a specific provision of an arbitration statute conflicts with
a federal labor policy that promotes arbitration in labor disputes.52
The state arbitration statutes of California,53 Illinois, 54 Ohio,55
and New York56 are representative of the modern statutes and these
states have experienced a considerable amount of litigation. Their
experience over labor arbitration presents a relatively accurate picture
of the problems with respect to labor arbitration and section 301
along with possible solutions.
52 Such a determination is obviously irrelevant where there is either a per se or a
non-application of the state statute.
53 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1280-1289.
54 IIl. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
55 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2711.01-2711.15 (Page 1953).
56 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7501-7514.
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A. Statutes That Exclude Labor Arbitration Agreements From
Coverage
Several state arbitration statutes do not cover labor arbitration
agreements,57 as they do not "apply to contracts between employers
and employees, or between employers and associations of employ-
ees ... " 8 These statutes pose a problem of whether a state can exclude
proceedings subject to section 301 from the purview of its arbitration
statutes. If the state can do so, where are the courts to look for
guidance when a case involves a labor arbitration question? There
57 The state statutes that today arguably attempt to exclude labor agreements
within collective bargaining contracts include: La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4216 (1950) "[the
statute not] apply to contracts of employment of labor or to contracts for arbitration
which are controlled by valid legislation of the United States. . ."; Md. Ann. Code art. 7,
§ 1 (196)--"not apply to an arbitration agreement between employers and employees or
between their respective representatives unless it is expressly provided in such agreement
that this article shall apply"; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27AS001 (1962)-the statute does
not "apply to collective contracts between employers and employees or associations of
employees in respect to terms or conditions of employment."; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.210
(1963)-this statute excludes agreements on the "terms or conditions of employment
under collective contracts between employers and employes or between employers and
association of employes . . . "; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 224 (Supp. 1965)-does
not apply "to any labor union contract or to any arbitration agreements or to any
arbitrations held pursuant to agreements between any employer and any employee of
that employer or between their respective representatives .. ."; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.01
(1958)-"the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to contracts between employers
and employes, or between employers and associations of employes .... " Several states
do not have a general arbitration statute, for example: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont.
Other states have had similar arbitration provisions excluding collective bargaining
agreements. See, e.g., Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 51 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1939),
which held that the old arbitration statute, Ariz. Code § 4294 (1928), excluded collective
bargaining agreements when it stated that "the provisions of this act shall not apply to
collective contracts between employers and employees, or between employers and associa-
tion of employers, in respect to terms or conditions of employment." See also Utility
Workers Union v. Ohio Power Co., 36 0. Ops. 324, 77 N.E.2d 629 (C.P. Ohio 1947),
which similarly interpreted the Ohio arbitration statute (before the statute's amendment)
to exclude collective bargaining contracts.
58 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.01 (1958). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that as
the court interprets this proviso, labor arbitration provisions within collective bargaining
contracts are valid but unenforceable. Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Allen-
Bradley Co., 259 Wis. 609, 49 N.W.2d 720 (1951). This interpretation was explained
further in Dumphy Boat Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 267 Wis.
316, 64 N.W.2d 866 (1954). The Wisconsin Supreme Court said that the Allen-Bradley
case held that the court could not enforce the arbitration agreement but that the state-
created Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, under § 111 et al. could so enforce
the agreement. This qualification is not relevant to the immediate question presented here.
Amended by Wis. Pub. Acts 1962, No. 27.
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is no doubt that a suit involving an arbitration provision contained
in a collective bargaining agreement within the scope of section 301
can be brought in a state court without concern of whether that state
excludes labor agreements from the coverage of its arbitration statutes.
It is the question of what procedures to apply to these arbitration
provisions that creates concern.
Suppose, for example, that a collective bargaining agreement was
signed between a Michigan employer and a union that represented
employees in an industry affecting interestate commerce. The contract
included an arbitration agreement but did not provide for the appoint-
ment of an arbitrator. In a controversy before the court on the issue of
whether the court can appoint the arbitrator to settle a labor dispute
between the union and the company, could the court point to the
Michigan statute with its provision permitting the court to appoint
an arbitrator in such a situation, and thus appoint the arbitrator? 9
Or need the court concern itself at all with the state statute when the
action is within section 301?6°
Congress has established in section 203 (d) of the National Labor
Management Relations Act,"1 a national policy of promoting arbitra-
tion in the settlement of labor disputes. This indicates that a liberal
application of arbitration procedures under section 301 was intended.
Thus, a state arbitration statute containing an exclusionary provision
should still be applied prima facie, but if a section is found to clash
with the federal policy in a particular instance, the state court should
look to other state statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. 2 Judge
Wyzanski stated in Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co.,
6 3
59 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.5016 (1962).
If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators,
this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the agreed method
fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed
fails or is unable to act and his successor has not been duly appointed, the court
on application of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators. An arbitrator
so appointed has all the powers of one specifically named in the agreement.
60 The specific problem of court appointment of arbitrators will be discussed in
detail infra.
61 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1964), Functions of [Federal Mediation and
Conciliation] Service.
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The Service is directed
to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such
grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases."
62 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
63 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1993).
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what was later implied by the Supreme Court in General Electric
Co. v. Local 205,6" when he said that the Federal Arbitration Act
should be used as a "guiding analogy." Thus both the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act and a state statute can supplement one another in defining
federal labor policy. The court first, however, should naturally make
a prima facie application of its own state statute since it may well
be that it is a violation of federal labor policy to exclude section 301
agreements from coverage.
If it is irrelevant under section 301 that the state arbitration
statute excludes collective bargaining agreements from its coverage,
then labor arbitration agreements have the same status regardless
of whether the state arbitration law has excluded them. Thus, the
question of conflict between state arbitration statutes and a federal
policy of promoting arbitration arises in states whose statutes include
collective bargaining agreements as well as in states whose statutes
exclude them.
When there is no state statute to supply a procedure the court
must necessarily look to outside sources."
B. The Subpoena Power of the Arbitrator
State arbitration statutes often give the arbitrator the power to
issue subpoenas 66 (usually at the initiation of the parties) for the
64 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
6 The states without a general arbitration statute include: Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont.
66 The following states have provisions for use of the subpoena power in arbitration:
Ala. Code tit. 7, § 837 (1958)-arbitrator only has power to call witnesses; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12-1507 (Supp. 1965); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-504 (1962); Cal. Civ. Proc.
§ 1286; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-412 (1960); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.17 (Supp. 1965);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 188-7 (1955); Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 107 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1965); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-207 (1933)-justice of the peace must issue the subpoena;
Iowa Code Ann. § 679.5 (Supp. 1965); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-204 (1964)-
justice of the peace or clerk of district court must issue the subpoena; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 417.013 (1963); La. Rev,. Stat. § 9:4206 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 26,
§ 956 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 7(a) (1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.14 (Supp.
1965); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.040 (1949)-arbitrator only has the power to call witnesses;
Miss. Code Ann. § 285 (1956)-must be issued by the clerk of the court or justice of the
peace; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:5 (1955) -arbitrator only has power to call witnesses;
NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:24-6 (1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7505; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-553
(1953); N.D. Cent Code § 32-29-05 (1960)-county justice must issue the subpoena;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.06 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.280(1) (1965); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 166 (1963); R.L Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-3-8 (1956); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 10-1903 (1962); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-509 (1955)-issued by the justice of the peace
or the clerk of the court; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 230(c) (Supp. 1965); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31-10 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.110 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.06
(1958) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.9(a) (Supp. 1963).
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attendance of witnesses, for the production of books, records and other
evidence, and for various other reasons.6 7 If in a section 301 arbitration,
there is a clash with the federal policy of favoring arbitration when a
prima facie application of the subpoena provision is made, no such
subpoena provision can then be utilized by the arbitrator.6 8
There is no doubt that the existence of a subpoena power in the
arbitrator would affect arbitration. Such a power in the arbitrator
arguably would enhance the effectiveness of arbitration. The arbitrator
then would be able to take a more active role in the arbitration proceed-
67 See, e.g., the following divisions of Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 107 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1965):
(a) The arbitrators may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the
production of books, records, documents, and other evidence, and shall have the power
to administer oathes. Subpoenas so issued shall be served, and upon application to the
court by a party or the arbitrators, enforced, in the manner provided by law for the
service and enforcement of subpoenas in civil cases.
(b) On application of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators may permit a
deposition to be taken, in the manner and upon the terms designated by the arbitrators,
of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing.
(c) All provisions of law compelling a person under subpoena to testify are
applicable ....
68 The courts of the four states investigated, California, Illinois, Ohio, and New
York, did not question whether the arbitrator has subpoena power. The cases indicated
that the courts assumed the arbitrator had such power. Although the cases did not state
whether the labor arbitration in question came within § 301, the cases do indicate the
state courts' general liberality toward the arbitration process.
In The Matter of Re-Anne Manufacturing Corp. 1 Misc. 2d 717, 720, 149
N.Y.S.2d 161, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1955), the court held that "an arbitrator can compel even
one not a party Vo the agreement to produce books and records if such documents are
shown to be pertinent, material or necessary to any matter lawfully under consideration
before him." (Emphasis added.) In Local 99, IL.G.W.U., AFL-CIO v. Clarise Sportswear
Co., 44 Misc. 2d 913, 255 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the court held that a labor
arbitrator is limited by the authority granted him in the contract and in this case could
require the party in question to produce only those books and records permitted by
the contract. The court in Katz v. Uvegi, 18 Misc. 2d 576, 582, 187 N.Y.S.2d 511, 517
(Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 773, 205 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1960), stated that though
arbitrators " may not be judges in name, they are judicial officers acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity and should possess the judicial qualifications of fairness to both parties,
so that they may render a faithful, honest, and disinterested opinion."
An Illinois court has concluded that "as a general rule, the power and authority of
arbitrators is derived from and determined by the arbitration agreement under which
they were appointed and by the provisions of the statute. The agreement and the
statutes should be read in harmony, if possible." West Towns Bus Co. v. Division 241
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Ry. Motor Coach Employees, AFL-CIO,
26 Ill. App. 2d 398, 406, 168 N.E.2d 473, 476-77 (1960). The implication of this state-
ment is that the courts will look first to the agreement to determine the intent of the
parties, a procedure which should be done in determining whether a statutory provision
violates the federal policy of favoring arbitration.
COMMENT
ings than if there were no such subpoena power. Arguments that the
arbitrator might abuse the subpoena power and that they do not have
the judicial prowess to use the power pertain to whether an arbitrator
should have subpoena power. Although there are arguments against
the grant of such power at the legislative level, they are not relevant
as to whether section 301 grants or denies such a power to the arbi-
trator.
Beginning with the premise that the state statutes are to be
applied in proceedings subject to section 301 unless they clash with
federal labor policy, a consideration of the possible existence of such
a clash is necessary. The denial of subpoena power to the arbitrator
could arguably frustrate the contractual intentions of the parties.
The customs in the particular industry, past agreements, past use of
subpoena power by the parties involved, and state arbitration statutes
granting such power, define the intention of the parties along with
the words of the contract itself. If the parties expressly exclude the
use of the subpoena power in the agreement, there is no federal policy
barring such exclusion since federal policy attempts to let the parties
themselves determine their arbitration process. But if the parties
intended the arbitrator to have subpoena power, their federal right
would require the fulfillment of this intention. Basing the existence
of the power on the contract would be a radical departure from
previous statutes that expressly grant subpoena power to an adminis-
trative agency. But, as here, where the federal policy would seem to
dictate the grant of subpoena power to the arbitrator, such a grant
should be implied through section 301. If the state statute is not
applicable per se as indicated above, it cannot be said that the state
statute was incorporated into the contract. 69 To effectuate the federal
policy of favoring the arbitration process, it is necessary to take a
practical approach to the problem and look at the situation in reverse
order. That is, if no subpoena power was given to the arbitrator
because section 301 arguably barred such an allocation of power, and
if any arbitrator operating under a section 301 collective bargaining
agreement could not exercise subpoena power, the legislative intent to
have disputes settled by the methods agreed to by the parties would
be greatly hindered.
The Federal Arbitration Act, in section 7, grants subpoena power
to the arbitrator with enforcement by the district court.7" Using this
as a guideline as to what the legislature felt should be necessary to
69 See Monte v. Southern Delaware County Authority, 321 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir.
1963).
70 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
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permit the parties to settle their own disputes, it would appear that
the subpoena power of the arbitrator cannot be relinquished without
placing an almost insurmountable roadblock to an effective arbitration
proceeding.
The federal policy that is to be adhered to is the encouragement
of the use of arbitration in labor disputes. State legislatures have felt
that an arbitrator should have subpoena power, and a majority of the
states have provided for this power in their statutes.71 Without the
subpoena in arbitration of labor disputes there would be a limitation
of the effective use of arbitration. The parties would not be as willing to
resort to arbitration if they know they might be stymied in the use of
the proceeding.
Taking together the federal policy of encouragement of labor
arbitration, the federal and state legislative intent to provide subpoena
power to arbitrators and the Supreme Court's directive to use these
state statutes as possible guidelines, the subpoena power should be
granted to the arbitrator when the proceedings are subject to section
301, even in states not specifically granting subpoena power in their
statutes.72
C. Order to Compel or Stay Arbitration; Stay of Action
Many state arbitration statutes provide for the application by
parties allegedly aggrieved for an order to compel or stay the arbitra-
tion or for an order to stay a court action pending the outcome of an
arbitrable issue.73
The Supreme Court's holding in Lincoln Mills removed any doubt
71 See note 66 supra.
72 Those states without subpoena power include: Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Virginia, and West Virginia.
73 See, e.g., the following section of N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law:
§ 7503. Application to compel or stay arbitration; stay of action; notice of intention
to arbitrate.
(a) Application to compel arbitration; stay of action. A party aggrieved by the
failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling arbitration. Where
there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made or complied
with, . . . the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate. Where any such question is
raised, it shall be tried forthwith in said court. If an issue claimed to be arbitrable is
involved in an action pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel
arbitration, the application shall be made by motion in that action. If the application is
granted, the order shall operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or so much of it
as if referable to arbitration.
(b) Application to stay arbitration .... [A] party who has not participated in the
arbitration and who has not made or been served with an application to compel arbitra-
tion, may apply to stay arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not made
or has not been complied with ....
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about whether courts may order arbitration in controversies covered
by arbitration agreements. Whether or not the state arbitration statute
provides for such an order by the court, the court should be able to
specifically enforce such an agreement. Without the ability to enforce,
the court would be deprived of its most effective means of encouraging
the arbitration of labor disputes.
Arbitration statutes often contain a provision to stay a pending
action if there is an arbitrable issue involved.74 The courts in the four
states studied in detail did not question their right, in the labor arbitra-
tion area, to grant a stay of an action pending arbitration. 5 Arguments
against judicial grants of stays where the arbitration is subject to sec-
tion 301 point out that there has been no specific grant of such power
to the courts. Traditionally, the courts have only been known to possess
the authority to specifically enforce arbitration agreements contained
within collective bargaining contracts. Thus, goes the argument, parties
have only the section 301 right to enforcement of their contract. But to
accept this position is to construe too strictly the substantive rights
granted by section 301, a fact evidenced by the Court's liberal approach
in Lincoln Mills.
The application for a stay of action is treated as an extension of
the request for specific performance of an arbitration provision in the
Lincoln Mills case. There is no doubt that this authority of the court
74 The states with provisions for stay of action include: Ala. Code tit. 7, § 829
(1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1502(D) (Supp. 1965); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1281.4
(Supp. 1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-409 (1958); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.12(3)
(Supp. 1965); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 188-5 (1955); I3. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 102 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1965); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4202 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 26, § 952
(1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 2(d) (1965); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150D § 2(d) (1965);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:2 (1955); N.J. Rev. Stat. 2A:24-4 (1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law § 7503(a); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.02 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.240
(1965); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 162 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-3-3 (1956);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 225(d) (Supp. 1965); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.030 (1961);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.02 (1958); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.4(d) (Supp. 1963).
75 The California courts have dealt with applications in labor disputes for a stay of
action pending arbitration without first determining whether the courts had authority to
issue such a stay of action. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carp., 49
Cal. 2d 45, 65, 315 P.2d 322, 333 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932; Thriftimart, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 421, 21 Cal. Rptr. 19 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ; Grunwald-
Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 192 CA.2d 268, 13
Cal. Rptr. 446 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Neither have the New York courts discussed the
possible conflict by an application to stay a proceeding under § 301. See, e.g., Long Island
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965); Parker v. Borock, 286
App. Div. 851, 141 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1955); Diamond v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 6 Misc.
2d 916, 164 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1957). No cases could be located in Ohio or Illinois
dealing with an application for a stay of action in a labor arbitration proceeding.
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to grant a stay of action comes within section 301; any refusal or
avoidance of an arbitrable issue being submitted to an arbitration pro-
ceeding is a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The ques-
tion of whether the court's authority to issue the stay is derived from
the state statute or from the federal policy supporting section 301 is
more academic than practical. The result in either case is the same. To
be consistent with the federal policy, the answer would have to be that
the stay power of the state court comes from section 301 itself and the
state statute was utilized through a prima facie application of that
statute.
7 6
If there is no stay provision within the statute or there is no
arbitration statute at all, the state court should still have the authority
to grant a stay in the appropriate cases. The remedy of specific enforce-
ment being available, assuming no waiver of the arbitration provisions
by the moving party, there is no logical reason why a stay cannot be
granted. Not to grant the stay would be in effect to deny specific per-
formance. Thus the moving party would be deprived of his federal
right because of lack of a statutory provision or a state statute. There
is no great difficulty in making the jump from allowing the issuance of a
stay of a court action, when a statute so permits, to allowing the stay
when the statute is silent or absent. Not to allow the jump would con-
flict with the federal policy.
Some arbitration statutes provide for a stay of arbitration only
under certain circumstances. If the purpose of allowing such a stay
is only to enforce compliance with a valid agreement against a recalci-
trant,7 8 it is no more than contract law. Or, if the local statute provides
that "the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or
76 The Supreme Court has indicated this consideration of federal policy when it held
that a contract could be interpreted to give the arbitrator authority over damage claims,
so that an employer's suit in a federal court under § 301 must be stayed pending arbitra-
tion. The Court said that "under our federal labor policy, therefore, we have every reason
to preserve the stabilizing influence of the collective bargaining contract . . . .We can
enforce both the no-strike clause and the agreement to arbitrate by granting a stay ....
Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1962).
77 The states that provide for stay of arbitration in their statutes include: Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12-1502(B) (Supp. 1965); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.12(4) (Supp. 1965); 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 10, § 102(b) (Smith-Hurd 1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 2(b) (1965); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 150C § 2(b) (1965); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7503(b); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 10-3-5 (1956); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 225(B) (Supp. 1965); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 7.04.040(4) (1961); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.4(b) (Supp. 1963).
78 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7503(b): "[A] party who has not participated in
the arbitration and who has not made or been served with an application to compel
arbitration may apply to stay arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not
made or has not been complied with ...."
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threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate, '7 9 the
court is merely determining the existence of a valid arbitration contract.
Courts would seem to have such authority even in the absence of a
statute since the collective bargaining contract contains the arbitration
provision which will be stayed. It has been held that no contracting
party can be compelled to submit to arbitration any matter which he
has not agreed to arbitrate." But since the parties generally have con-
tracted to so arbitrate, the federal policy desires to give effect to such
agreements whenever possible and thus a stay of arbitration cannot
generally be granted, unless it is upon the basis of general contract law
that no agreement exists.8 ' To maintain consistency in the arbitration
procedures, the test for stay of arbitration should necessarily be the
same as that for an action to compel arbitration.82 The court should
not look into the question of arbitrability of the issue. The court should
only determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and then
if such an agreement is found, let the arbitrator determine the question
of arbitrability.
D. Vacation or Modification of the Award
The vast majority of state arbitration statutes contain a provision
permitting a court to declare an award void under certain conditions. 3
79 31. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
80 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); Vul-
can-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO, 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961).
81 A federal court has said: "[Airbitration is a contractual procedure . .. . If the
parties, for their own good reasons, have bargained for determination of controversies by
arbitration rather than by a court, such agreement must prevail." General Warehousemen
& Employees Union No. 636 v. American Hardware Supply Co., 329 F.2d 789, 792 (3d
Cir. 1964).
82 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 US. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
83 See, for example, the following section of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code (Supp. 1965):
§ 1286.2 Grounds for Vacation of Award:
[Tlhe court shall vacate the award if the court determines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected with-
out affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or by the
refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other
conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
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The existence of this power is generally consistent with section 301.'
The ability of the court to vacate an award is generally limited to cer-
tain specified grounds. Although both parties submit to arbitration as
required by an arbitration agreement, the defect might well come
when the arbitrator issues the award. The award of the arbitrator is
normally final and conclusive, and courts will not review the merits of
the dispute. 5 Thus, it is apparent that state legislatures have great
faith in the arbitration process. The collective bargaining agreement
contemplates an unprejudiced, unbiased award, and it follows that if
an award is not made impartially or without bias the agreement has
not been fulfilled.86 Without a procedure for vacation or modification
the courts would be at a loss as to correcting the prejudice suffered
by either party.
Problems do arise when some of the possible grounds are relied on
by the court. For example, the court which sets aside an award because
the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the controversy 7
may run afoul of the prohibition on the court's determination of the
merits. If the federal courts view such a provision as being contrary to
federal labor arbitration policy, the award cannot be set aside on the
theory that the decision of the arbitrator was not supported by the evi-
84 The states that have a provision in their arbitration statutes for vacation of an
award, include: Ala. Code tit. 7 § 842 (1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1512 (Supp.
1965); Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-509 (1962); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2 (Supp. 1965); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-418 (1958); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.22 (Supp. 1965); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 7.111 (Supp. 1965); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 188-9 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 7-907
(1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Iowa Code Ann. § 679.12
(1950); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-211 (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.018 (1963);
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4210 (1950); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C, § 11 (1965); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. ch. 26, § 958 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 12 (1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.19
(Supp. 1965); Miss. Code Ann. § 290 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.100 (1949); Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. § 93-201-7 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2115 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 38.170 (1963); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542:8 (1955); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:24-8 (1952);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7511(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-559 (1953); NJ). Cent. Code
§ 32-29-08 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.10 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33230
(1963); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 170 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-3-12 (1956);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-514 (1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 237 (Supp. 1965); Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31-16 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 8-506 (1957); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 7.04.160 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5502 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.10 (1958);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.14 (Supp. 1963).
85 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 229 Cal. App. 2d
607, 40 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1964).
86 The grounds listed in the provision cited supra note 83, indicate that the courts
would grant such vacation only when the agreement has not been fairly adhered to.
87 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(e) (Supp. 1965).
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dence.85 Since the arbitrator's powers come from the collective bargain-
ing agreement, any powers exercised by him beyond those given him in
the agreement are a violation of the contract and enforcement of such
an award would be sanctioning a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. The vacation of the award is a practical way to enforce the
federal right created by section 301. The grounds for vacation should
be limited to offenses committed by the arbitrator which adversely af-
fect this federal right of the parties under section 301 and not, for
example, grounds which would clash with any federal arbitration law.
The state courts have held that the court cannot review the merits
of the arbitrator's decision,89 and that the question of arbitrability
itself90 is barred after an award has been rendered. These holdings
rely upon the "trilogy" cases9 for such a holding. Effective labor
arbitration requires that the arbitrator's decision have finality, 2 but
the question of arbitrability should be reviewable by the courts even if
it is raised after the award. Arbitrability goes to the essence of whether
the issue comes within the arbitration agreement. However, since the
federal policy does not presently permit review of the question of
arbitrability in the courts, a provision permitting vacation when ma-
terial evidence is excluded would violate this policy. Such a provision
would conffict with the existing bar on court determination of arbitra-
bility as set down in the "trilogy" cases. The burden is upon the courts
to scrutinize each factual situation to determine if the action of the
arbitrator has prejudiced the right of either party to a fair award.
The modification of an award by either the arbitrator or the court
is a practical means of obtaining the award which should have been
rendered but which, through error, was not.93 The provisions for vacat-
88 See, e.g., Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1960).
89 Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 229 Cal. App.
2d 607, 40 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1964).
00 Classic Togs, Inc. v. Joint Bd. of Cloak, Suit, Skirt, Reefer Makers' Union,
Shirt Dep't, Local 231, IL.G.W.U., 27 Misc. 2d 598, 211 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
91 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
92 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99
(1960).
93 An example of provisions setting down grounds for modification by the arbitrator
are the following section of the Cal. Civ. Proc. Code (Supp. 1965): Sec. 1286.6. Grounds
for Correction of Award ... the court, unless it vacates the award . . . , shall correct
the award and confirm it as corrected if the court determines that:
(a) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;
(b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
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ing an award contemplate an error which prejudices the rights of one
or both of the parties and which is not capable of being corrected by
merely modifying a specific part of the award. The errors which might
make modification appropriate would be both correctable and relatively
minute. The general provision for modification and the specific grounds
cause no clash with the federal policy. In fact, it promotes the policy
of favoring the arbitration process in labor disputes since the modifica-
tion provision grants to the prejudiced party a means to correct the
award without resorting to a new arbitration proceeding or to court
action on the same issues.
If the state statute provides for modification by the court94 but
does not provide for modification by the arbitrator,95 the statute can
still safely be followed without fear of a clash with federal policy. The
result of not giving the arbitrator this modification power is merely the
elimination of one of the sources to which a party can resort. However,
to allow no modification at all would be limiting the correction pro-
(c) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
§ 1284 Correction of Award ...
The arbitrators, upon written application of a party to the arbitration, may correct
the award upon any of the grounds set forth in subdivisions (a) and (c) of Sec.
1286.6 ....
94 The states with provisions in their arbitration statutes for modification of the
award by the court include: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1513 (Supp. 1965); Cal. Civ.
Proc. § 1286.6 (Supp. 1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-419 (1947); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 57.23 (Supp. 1964); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 188-10 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 7-908
(1947); IlI. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 113 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); La. Rev. Stat.
§ 9:4211 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 26, § 959 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 13
(1965); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C, § 12 (1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.20 (Supp.
1965); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.110 (1949); Miss. Code Ann. § 291 (1956); Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 93-201-8 (1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 38.180 (1963); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 542:8 (1955); NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:24-9 (1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7511(c);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-560 (1943); ND. Cent. Code § 32-29-09 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2711.11 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.330 (1963); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 171
(1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-3-12 (1956); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-515 (1955); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 238 (Supp. 1965); Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-17 (1953); Wash.
Rev. Code § 7.04.170 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5504 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.11
(1958) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.15 (Supp. 1963).
95 The states with provisions in their arbitration statutes for modification of the
award by the arbitrator include: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1509 (Supp. 1965)-but only
on "submission to the arbitrators by the court"; Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1284 (Supp. 1965);
IEl. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 109 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 9 (Supp.
1965); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C, § 8 (1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.16 (Supp. 1965);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7509; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 232 (Supp. 1965); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 1-1048.11 (Supp. 1963).
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cedure that is necessary to promote arbitration. Therefore modification
of an award should be possible even without a statutory provision.,
E. Court Appointment of Arbitrators
Since many of the state statutes do provide for court appointment
of arbitrators,07 the question arises whether a court may appoint the
arbitrator in section 301 labor arbitration.98
The agreement of the parties may or may not provide for the ap-
pointment of the arbitrator either by the parties themselves or by a
court. On the other hand, the agreement may stipulate that a court
shall appoint an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator
or do not set up their own selection method.
96 The states with a provision in their arbitration statute for vacation of an award
but no provision for modification of the award include: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Virginia.
97 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.04 (Page 1953) which states in part:
If, in the arbitration agreement, provision is made for a method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator or an umpire, such method shall be followed. If no
method is provided therein, or if a method is provided and any party thereto
fails to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there is a lapse
in the naming of an arbitrator or an umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon
the application of either party to the controversy the court... shall... appoint
an arbitrator or umpire, who shall act under said agreement with the same effect
as if he had been specifically named therein.
98 No cases could be located in any of the four states investigated relevant to this
question. The states that have a provision in their statute for court appointment of the
arbitrator include: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1503 (Supp. 1965); Cal. Civ. Proc § 1281.6
(Supp. 1965) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-411 (1958) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.13 (Supp. 1965);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 188-4 (1955); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4204 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
ch. 26, § 954 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 7, § 3 (1965); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 150C § 3
(1965); Mich. Stat. Ann. 27A.5015 (1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 572.10 (Supp. 1965);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 38.050 (1963); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 542.4 (1955); NJ. Rev. Stat.
§ 2A:24-5 (1952); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7504; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-547 (1943); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.04 (Page 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 33.250 (1963); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 5, § 164 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 10-3-6 (1956); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-504
(1955); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 226 (Supp. 1965); Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-4
(1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.04.050 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 298.04 (1958); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 1-1048.5 (Supp. 1963).
Several states have provisions in their statutes which expressly or implicitly exclude
the court from appointing the arbitrator. These states include: Ala. Code tit. 7, §§ 829, 830
(1958)-the arbitrator is to be chosen "by the parties"; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 103
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964)--"if the method of appointment of arbitrators is not specified
in the agreement and cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the entire agreement shall
terminate."; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann § 5-202 (1964)-the arbitrator is to be "naturally
agreed upon by the parties"; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-2 (1953)-the arbitrator shall be
chosen "by the parties"; S.C. Code Ann. § 10-1902 (1962)-the arbitrator shall be
chosen "by the parties."
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At least one court has accepted the responsibility where the parties'
agreement contained no provision for the appointment of an arbitra-
tor. 9 Although one judge questioned whether this was a judicial func-
tion of the court, the majority felt that it was important for labor peace
that the arbitration process not be allowed to fail and that the courts
should exercise their "judicial inventiveness."
When the contract includes a provision for arbitration, it follows
that the parties expected an arbitrator to be chosen. A failure to appoint
an arbitrator would render such a collective bargaining provision abor-
tive. If the contract is silent as to a method of selection, the parties may
have simply made an incomplete agreement which, under contract law,
the courts will not normally complete for them. Possibly, the parties
either desired to determine the method of appointment later, or im-
pliedly incorporated the state arbitration provision into the agreement.
If this is the case, the intention of the parties would be that the court
appoint the arbitrator in a needed situation. Thus, in accordance with
the federal policy of favoring the arbitration process, the courts should
appoint the arbitrator. But is this a judicial function? Congress in the
Federal Arbitration Act, felt it was a judicial function since that act
provided for court appointment of arbitrators in certain circumstances.
Some state statutes have likewise provided for court appointment in
certain situations. A prima facie application of the state statute would
encourage the labor arbitration process by utilizing the court to appoint
the arbitrator unless the intentions of the parties clearly indicate that
at the time of the making of the contract no such appointment was
desired.
What of the situation where the state arbitration statute does not
provide for court appointment of an arbitrator?"' If there is no pro-
vision in the contract either express or implied that the court should
have this authority, there would be no clash with federal labor policy
if the court did so even absent statutory authorization. Favoring the
settlement of labor disputes by means of the parties own choosing is
based upon a premise that the parties have so agreed and therefore this
agreement ought to be given effect. An intent that the court appoint an
arbitrator can be implied from past agreements and past proceedings of
the parties and from the arbitration agreements within the same in-
dustry. Such an implication does not amount to giving the parties the
99 Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. Local 612, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1962).
100 The states with arbitration statutes that do not provide for court appointment
of the arbitrator include: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
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authority to grant the courts the power to appoint the arbitrator. The
power is always there for the parties to utilize. This procedure is ana-
logous to the procedure in states which have provisions in their statutes
for court appointment but require the party to make application to the
court for appointment of the arbitrator. In those states with no such
statutory provision the parties must "make application" at an earlier
time.
Using the state statutes as a guideline, a liberal application of the
court's power to appoint an arbitrator would encourage the effective
use of the arbitration process, and thus, the grant of such a power would
be appropriate in proceedings covered by section 301.
CONCLUSION
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act gives the
courts the right to specifically enforce collective bargaining contracts
between employers and unions representing employees in industries
affecting commerce. Arbitration agreements within such collective bar-
gaining contracts also fall under section 301(a), and the right to have
such contracts enforced is governed by a federal substantive law,
however, state arbitration statutes can be applied prima facie in pro-
ceedings over such a contract.
Particular provisions of the state arbitration statutes may, how-
ever, adversely affect the stated federal policy of encouraging arbitra-
tion in labor disputes. For this reason arbitration statutes should not
be applied per se. Courts must use the statutes as a guideline in
determining what the federal substantive law should be. Courts could
use a non-application, looking at all the statutes in general each time
and attempting to create a general arbitration "statute" from the par-
ticular state statutes. This, however, is very impractical and would
lead to more problems than it would solve. A third method is the prima
facie application of the statutes; applying the particular statutory pro-
visions unless they clashed with federal labor policy. This third method
follows the order of the Supreme Court to utilize the state law in this
area. Such an application will, by definition, be consistent with the
federal policy of encouraging labor arbitration.
An analysis of several important sections of the state arbitration
statutes show that a liberal view should be taken as to what provisions
should be valid under section 301, and thus such provisions as those
granting a stay of action, subpoena power to the arbitrator, vacation
or modification of the award, and court appointment of the arbitrator,
should be utilized to further labor arbitration agreements.
A problem, however, arises when there is no provision within the
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statute for a particular situation, e.g., court appointment of an arbi-
trator. After a determination of whether the lack of such a provision
clashes with federal labor policy, the court should, if the court finds
such a clash, make the appointment or take such other action as is
necessary to effect such policy.
A prima facie application of state arbitration statutes in proceed-
ings subject to section 301 will provide courts with the necessary guide-
lines to further the federal policy of favoring the arbitration process as
well as permit maximum use of state arbitration statutes which are
familiar to the local arbitrators, judges, and parties.
Edward A. Matto
